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On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-850-900) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 28, 2020 
 
Before:  JORDAN, MATEY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se petitioner Alhagi Samba petitions for review of a final order of removal and 
the denial of his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For 
the reasons detailed below, we will deny the petition. 
 Samba is a citizen of The Gambia.  He entered the United States in 1988, and then 
overstayed his visa.  In 2006, he was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of conspiring 
to deliver marijuana and violating the corrupt-organizations statute.  He was then charged 
with being removable as an alien who had (1) remained in the United States for a longer 
time than permitted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B); (2) been convicted of a law relating to 
a controlled substance, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); and (3) been convicted of an 
aggravated felony, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Through counsel, Samba conceded 
removability on the first two grounds, and the Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the third.  
Samba applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 
 At a hearing before an IJ, Samba testified in support of his applications.  He said 
that he is a member of the minority Jola tribe.  The former president of The Gambia, 
Yahya Jammeh, also a member of the Jola, was a brutal dictator.  In 2016, Jammeh was 
defeated in an election by Adama Barrow, a member of a different tribe.  Samba claims 
that this political transition has caused upheaval and increased discord between tribes, 
and he fears that he will be tortured in The Gambia as a member of a minority tribe.   
 In a thorough opinion, the IJ denied all relief to Samba.  The IJ concluded that 
Samba was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to his aggravated 
felony (which qualified as a particularly serious crime).  The IJ also denied Samba’s CAT 
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claim, finding that there was no evidence that he would be harmed or mistreated in The 
Gambia or that the government would acquiesce to any torture.  Samba appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s conclusions and dismissed 
the appeal.  Samba filed a petition for review to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  Because Samba is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, our jurisdiction is generally limited to questions of law and constitutional claims, 
see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), although we retain jurisdiction to review factual challenges to the 
CAT decision, see Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2020).  We review the 
agency’s factual determinations under the substantial-evidence standard, such that “the 
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 Samba argues first that the agency erred in concluding that he was not likely to be 
tortured in The Gambia.  We disagree.  Samba was not harmed prior to leaving the 
country, and he presented no evidence that he would be in danger if he returns.  The State 
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 states that there had 
been no incidents of government-sponsored killings, disappearances, or torture in the past 
year.  See A.R. at 262–63.  Indeed, as the IJ accurately explained, “many individuals who 
left the Gambia due to President Jammeh’s awful human rights record have been 
returning to Gambia, and conditions have generally been improving since [P]resident 
Jammeh has left.”  Id. at 94.  Thus, the record does not compel the conclusion that Samba 
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would be harmed in The Gambia.  See generally Guzman Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 956 
F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that “what is likely to happen to the petitioner if 
removed” is a factual question). 
 Samba also argues that the agency erred in concluding that the government would 
not acquiesce to his torture.1  See generally Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 788 
(3d Cir. 2019) (discussing acquiescence standard).  Again, the record does not support his 
contention.  To reiterate, the State Department’s Report says that the new regime in The 
Gambia has been dramatically improving conditions in the country and taking active 
steps to respond to past abuses.  While Samba refers to a newspaper article that reports 
that the government has exacerbated tribal tensions through poor public relations and by 
failing to balance the representation of tribal groups in the cabinet, the agency did not err 
in concluding that this does not mean that the government would acquiesce to torture.  
See generally Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 343 (3d Cir. 2020); Myrie v. Att’y 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2017). 




1 Contrary to Samba’s argument that the “[t]he IJ never addressed whether [his] fear of 
torture from non-government actors could carry his burden under CAT,” Br. at 5, the IJ 
expressly ruled that the government would not acquiescence to any such torture, see A.R. 
at 76; see also id. at 4 (BIA’s opinion stating that the record “does not establish that 
people of his ethnicity are being frequently targeted for mistreatment rising to the level of 
torture, or otherwise establish that he will more likely than not be singled out for torture 
by any actor, for any reason, by or with the acquiescence of a government official” 
(emphasis added)). 
